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Currently Pakistan’s economy is under stress and registered a sluggish 
growth for many years in a row. The performance of major economic 
indicators is not satisfactory. Low investment, double digit inflation, fiscal 
imbalances and low external capital inflows indicates the severity of the 
grave economic situation. This paper investigates fiscal and monetary 
policy interaction in Pakistan using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model. Finding of the paper reveals that fiscal and monetary policy interacts 
with each other and with other macroeconomic variables.  Inflation 
responds to fiscal policy shocks in the form of government spending, 
revenue and borrowing shocks. Monetary authority’s decisions are also 
affecting fiscal policy variables. It is also evident that fiscal discipline is 
critical for the effective formulation and execution of monetary policy.  
JEL Classifications:  E32, E37, E52, E61, E63, 
Keywords:  Monetary Policy, Fiscal Dominance, DSGE, Pakistan 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Currently Pakistan’s economy is under stress and registered a sluggish growth for 
many years in a row. Economy is passing through the difficult time of its history. 
Outlook is bleak and gloomy. The performance of major economic indicators is not 
satisfactory. Low investment, persistent and high inflation, fiscal imbalances and low 
external capital inflows indicates the severity of the grave economic situation. Another 
important issue is the persistent and continuous budget deficit which is the bone of 
contention between fiscal authority and state bank of Pakistan. Persistence budget deficits 
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and government borrowing deters the formulation and execution of an independent 
monetary policy.  
State Bank of Pakistan is adopting tight monetary policy in order to discourage 
government borrowing from the domestic banking system and non-bank financial 
institutions, particularly from the state bank of Pakistan. But even the higher interest rate 
is not working as preventive arms to stop the federal government’s borrowing. There are 
many reasons, the first and at the forefront is the friendly attitude of the State bank of 
Pakistan. State bank acts amicably and never decline Federal government’s demands for 
fund to bridge the fiscal gap. SBP always extends a helping hand by providing the 
demanded seigniorage to the government. Another issue is the non-serious attitude of the 
Federal government.  Fiscal authority and politicians failed to stop fiscal slippages and is 
not serious in ensuring fiscal consolidation and adjustments. Third, politicians and 
treasury benches never allowed SBP to act and operate independently. Numerous 
institutional arrangements are made and number of legislations passed from the 
parliament for the independency and autonomy of State Bank of Pakistan. In 1994 
monetary and fiscal policy coordination board was formulated for greater cooperation 
between fiscal and monetary policy. But significant lack of coordination has been 
observed over the years. From 1966 to 2012, these authorities coordinated effectively 
only 13 times to achieve broad macroeconomic goals (see, Figure 1 for self explanatory 
visual representation).   
 
Fig. 1.  Years of Monetary/Fiscal Policy Coordination in Pakistan 
 
Source: Arby and Hanif (2010) and Authors’ Calculations up-to Fiscal Year 2012. -1 0 1
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However, over the periods, State Bank of Pakistan is trying to implement 
various policy reforms to overcome coordination failure. For example, in 2005, fiscal 
responsibility and debt limitation act was introduced in order to stop budget deficits 
and to reduce public debt gradually. Again On 10 March 2012 president of Pakistan 
signed and endorsed state bank of Pakistan amendment Bill 2012. The objective of 
the amended draft is to reduce the powers of the politicians and treasury to influence 
monetary authority. The bill also aims to put brakes on federal government or other 
public agencies borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. New bill seeks the 
formulation and execution of monetary policy more independently.  Government of 
Pakistan passed legislation time and again to stop federal government from running 
excessive budget deficits, discourage the accumulation of huge public debt and to 
provide autonomy to the state bank of Pakistan. Unfortunately legislations are not 
implemented in its true spirit and the objectives of these institutional arrangements 
are not being materialised. Figure 2 shows a gradual increase of budget deficit as 
percent of GDP especially after FY03. In order to finance fiscal gap, government 
mainly rely on borrowing from domestic sources. This figure also shows a massive 
increase in total public sector borrowing as percent of GDP. Figure 3, on the other 
hand shows the process of monetisation mainly through government borrowing and 
its likely consequences on consumer price index (CPI) inflation. The continuous 
increasing trend in both CPI inflation and borrowing behaviour pushes central bank 
to increase its policy discount rate. Hence, a war between fiscal and monetary 
authority over budget deficits and borrowing from State Bank of Pakistan drive the 
debate on the interactions of fiscal and monetary policy.  
 
Fig. 2.  Public Sector Borrowing, Budget Deficit and Policy Discount Rate 
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Fig. 3.  CPI Inflation, Government Borrowing and Policy Discount Rate 
 
 
Therefore, we investigate in this paper the degree of interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policy. Following Cebi (2012), we modify DSGE model by incorporating 
public sector borrowing in the central bank reaction function. The unrestrained federal 
government’s borrowing from the banking system in general and from State Bank of 
Pakistan in particular forces us to include it in the model. In a recent work, Choudhari 
and Malik (2012) while analysing the objectives of monetary policy in Pakistan termed 
government borrowing as a constraint on monetary policy. Monetary authority’s choice 
of policy instrument and the level of inflation are greatly affected by fiscal deficits and 
it’s financing. This is the main reason that forced State Bank to give weight to public 
finances especially Federal government borrowing while formulating and executing 
monetary policy.  
Economies are changing momentarily. And it is very much difficult to capture all 
the dynamism, features and attributes of these changing economies. But the use of 
different models enables and helps us to get closer to the real picture of the shift in 
economic environment. Tracking the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy interaction 
in Pakistan is important because fiscal dominancy has important implications and state 
bank of Pakistan is prone to the significant political pressure. Active fiscal policy plays a 
critical role in the determination of many macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, 
government spending and its revenues decisions and frequent intervention from the 
treasury benches undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy. Keeping in perspective 
the deteriorated fiscal position of the federal government, we modified the DSGE model 
with fiscal and monetary policy constraints. The objective of using DSGE model for the 
interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in Pakistan is to explore avenues for the 
effective formulation and execution of these policies. 
The paper is designed in such a manner that Section 2 describes the relevant 
literature review. Section 3 illustrates dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for 
the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies. In Section 4 discuss calibration results and 
Section 5 presents some policy prescription in perspective of these findings and wrapping 
up remarks.    
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Researchers, policy makers and economic managers are increasingly interested in 
the use of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models (DSGE) for macroeconomic 
analysis.  Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium is relatively complex as compared 
with earlier models for macroeconomic analysis.  This paper uses small scale open 
economy DSGE model followed the one used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), Haider 
and Khan (2008) and Cebi (2012). The model is modified by incorporating fiscal 
authority and especially the federal government borrowing. The main drawback of the 
previous models used for macroeconomic analysis like real business cycles is the absence 
of room for policy intervention. Because RBC suggests that business cycles respond to 
shocks optimally and there is no role of policy makers to play and intervene through its 
policy instrument. On the other hand consensus exists among researcher and 
academicians that DSGE model is very effective in analysing the relationships and has 
the immunity against the famous Lucas critique.  
The field is new but quite enough literature is available on DSGE models due 
to the increased interest of policy maker and academicians in this area. The 
importance of DSGE models have forced the central bankers around the world to 
adopt these models for policy making and bring it out from the contours of academic 
discussion. In the last several years there is surprising developments in DSGE 
modelling. Following the famous Real Business Cycle theory, Kydland and Prescott 
(1982) have started work on DSGE modelling. Dynamic Stochastic general 
equilibrium model heavily based on the new Keynesian set up. New Keynesians 
school of thought provides greater room by assigning an important role to fiscal and 
monetary policy for stabilisation. The inclusion of different assumptions largely 
contributed in the development of DSGE model.  
DSGE is frequently used by the central bankers for analysing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy while the role of fiscal policy is largely ignored. Similarly much of the 
attention has been given to the monetary policy rules. The earlier version of the new 
Keynesians dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models have limited role for the 
fiscal policy. For example, Gali (2003) presents a symbolic and narrow role for the fiscal 
policy.  Ratto, et al. (2009) also identified that less attention has been given to the public 
sector and to the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy interaction in DSGE models. 
Muscatelli, et al. (2004) investigate the issue of fiscal and monetary policy interaction 
and modified the model by including the extended version of fiscal policy transmission 
channels. They estimated the model instead of calibration. Literature also discussed the 
two policies as strategic substitutes versus strategic complements. Charles (1999) 
explores that fiscal and monetary policy behaves as a strategic substitutes. Hagen, et al. 
(2001) termed the relationship between fiscal and monetary authority as an asymmetric. 
This implies that expansionary fiscal policy is accompanied by tight monetary policy 
stance. Muscatelli and Mundschenk (2001) probe that the strategic substitutability of 
fiscal and monetary policy does not applied to the all economies. Melitz (1997) also 
looked into the matter of fiscal and monetary policy but the results are largely 
ambiguous. It is not clear from his findings that the relationship between the policy 
instruments of the two authorities over the period depends on policy or some structural 
shocks.        
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Strand of literatures also available on the fiscal and monetary policy interaction in 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model focusing a greater role for the fiscal 
authority. Coenen and Straub (2005) realised the active role played by treasury in policy 
making and its impact on the economy. They incorporate active and dominant fiscal 
policy along non-Ricardian consumer into the DSGE model. Keeping the permanent 
income hypothesis, considerable number of economic agents are non-Ricardian in nature 
against the standard IS curve which heavily relied on the assumption of Ricardian 
equivalence. They investigate consequences of active and dominant fiscal policy and find 
considerable influence of fiscal policy over macroeconomic variables. They termed the 
micro-foundation and optimising agents based model very effective for assessing 
outcomes of different economic policies. Central bankers in developed and developing 
economies have modified DSGE model according to the prevailing situation in their 
respective economies.  Tovar (2009) suggests that DSGE model is useful in exploring the 
basis of instability, remarkable in the identification of structural changes, estimate and 
anticipate the effects of alternate policy regime. Considerable portion of the existing 
literature is contributed to the panel date but over the years, remarkable contribution by 
researchers has been made to the DSGE modelling and they termed these models equally 
useful for time series data.  Smets and Wouters (2003) allowed for different structural 
shocks. They reveal that beside panel data, DSGE models are able to calculate and 
predict time series data as well. Bernanke et al (1999) also include time series data of 
financial fractions into DSGE models. Cespedes, et al. (2004) also investigated DSGE 
models while incorporating the financial sector. They investigated the impact of firm’s 
balances on the investment. Choi and Cook (2004) have incorporated banking sector and 
examine the performance while using DSGE model. Milani (2004) contributed 
differently by comparing learning and the mechanical source of persistence like rational 
expectation in habit formation or inflation indexation. Davereux and Saito (2005) 
developed an alternate approach that allowed for time-varying portfolio in the DSGE 
models. Engel and Matsumto (2005) kept the centre of attention on complete market and 
included assets markets plus portfolio choice in the DSGE model. Devereux and 
Sutherland (2006) further investigated the issue and present a general formula for entire 
range of assets that is compatible with DSGE models.  Fabio and Sala (2006) have added 
to the literature by investigating DSGE model particularly the identifiability and its 
repercussions for parameter estimations. An and Schorfheide (2007) revisited the related 
literature with DSGE and discuss at length the empirical implications of the model. 
Christiano, et al. (2007) extending the model into a small open economy framework and 
modified the model to include financial friction and fraction in the labour market. 
Adolfson, et al. (2008) studied DSGE with various assumptions while analysing the 
impact of monetary policy and transmission of shocks in the economy. They also 
investigate the trade-off between inflation stabilisation as well as output gap stabilisation 
with the help of DSGE framework.  
Keeping in perspective the advantages of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
models, both developed and developing economies are formulating DSGE models for their 
economies. The central banks around the world are frequently using these models for analysis 
and diagnosing economic problems and policy formulation. The robustness of the DSGE 
models has derived the debate on the use of these models in emerging economies for policy 
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analysis. Following the seminal work of Christiano, et al. (2005), Coenen and Straub (2005) 
and Cebi (2012), model used in this thesis is an open economy DSGE model with some 
modification. We modified the model by incorporating federal government borrowing from 
state bank of Pakistan. We investigate the response of domestic output, taxes, inflation, 
monetary policy instrument and other variables to government borrowing shock. We estimate 
the parameters for the economy of Pakistan while using DSGE model in order to be consistent 
with the micro-foundation of our economy.  
We take two policy environments. In the first specification, we calibrate the 
original DSGE model used by Cebi (2012) excluding government borrowing. In the 
second specification some modification has been made while incorporate fiscal policy, 
particularly federal government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. Recognising its 
significance, we check technology as well as foreign output shocks, besides fiscal and 
monetary policy variables shocks.  
 
3.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We use a small-scale open economy model for Pakistan. Following Cebi (2012), 
Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010), Ortiz, et al. (2009), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Fialho 
and Portugal (2005), the model set in motion with infinitely lived household who seeks to 
maximise the expected present discounted value of life time utility subject to inter 
temporal budget constraint: 

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Where =1(1+)t is the household discount factor and (0,1),  is the inverse inters 
temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,   is inverse labour supply elasticity 
with respect to real wage and  is relative weight on consumption of public goods. The 
aggregate variables in the utility function Ct, Gt and Nt 
are private consumption, 
government spending and labour supplied respectively.  
 
Household Inter-temporal Budget Constraint 
The household inter-temporal budget constraint is  
Pt Ct + Pt Gt + Et [Qt,t+1Dt+1]+T< Dt + (1+t) WtNt … … … (2) 
Where Qt,t+1=1/(1+rt) is one period ahead stochastic discount factor, rt is nominal interest 
rate, T denote constant lump sum taxes and t represent income tax rate. Wt is the nominal 
wage rate, Dt is nominal portfolio, Pt is consumer price index, Ct is composite 
consumption index which consist of index of domestically produced goods (CH,t) and 
index of imported goods (CF,t), and Gt is consumption index of public goods. These 
goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms. 
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A forwarding looking open economy IS curve by solving FOC,s simultaneously is: 
    1,*11 ˆˆ
1
ˆ)1)(1()(ˆˆ * 

 

 tHtttcttttt ErcgEyEy  … (3) 
Where 



)1(
  
And   +(1–)(–1)  
Parameter >0 denotes elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
goods,  measures the share of domestic consumption allocated to foreign goods (degree 
of openness) and  reflects elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in 
different foreign countries. Endogenous variables are defined as follows:  
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The forward looking open economy IS curve is given as: 
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n
trˆ  denote natural rate of output and nominal interest rate. These 
are the equilibrium level of output and interest rate in the absence of nominal rigidities 
which can be described as:  
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 … … … (6) 
Where taˆ  is the log of technology process, At. 
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Behaviour of the Firm and Price Setting 
Following, Haider and Khan (2008) and Cebi (2012), there is continuum of 
identical monopolistically firms in the economy. These firms produce differentiated 
products using linear technology: 
Yt(j) = At Nt (j)  … … … … … … … (7) 
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that a fraction 1 –  of the firm can set a new 
price in each period and a fraction  of them keeps its price unchanged. To take the 
inflation persistency in consideration, we also incorporate backward looking behaviour in 
price setting process by following Gali and Gertler (1999) and Cebi (2012): 
2,
1,*
1,,



tH
tH
tH
b
tH
P
P
PP  … … … … … … (8) 
Where,    

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b
tH
f
thtH PPP 1,
1
1,
*
1,  is the aggregate prices chosen in period t – 1 by both 
optimising (forward looking, 
f
thP 1,  ) and rule of thumb (backward looking, 
b
tHP 1,  )  price 
setters. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) take into account lagged dynamics in 
the Phillips curve. Assuming that a fraction 1 –  of the firm can set a new price 
optimally in each period as in calvo model, the remaining part  set their prices by using 
the previous period inflation rate. The rule of thumb price setter take into account the past 
period inflation rate 
2,
1,
1,


 
tH
tH
tH
P
P
 as well as aggregate prices 
*
1, tHP  occurred in 
period t – 1, when they reset their prices in period t. the existence of backward looking 
firms besides forward looking firms allows us to obtain a log-linearised open economy 
hybrid Phillips curve in terms of deviation from steady state: 
    tttHtftHtH cmE ˆˆˆˆ 1,1,6,
 
 … … … … (9) 
  ttnttt gyycm   ˆˆˆˆˆ  … … … … … (10) 
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is the marginal cost and 
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ln  is a log-linearised tax rate. t represent 
cost push shock which we include in Phillips curve by following, among others, Smet and 
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Wouters (2007) Beetsma and Jensen (2004), Ireland (2004), and Fragetta and Kirsanova 
(2010). Following Smets and Wouters (2003) and  Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010). 
According to equation (10) government spending and income tax as well as output 
gap directly affect inflation via Equation (9). The slope coefficient of Phillips curve  
shows sensitivity of domestic inflation with respect to real marginal cost. 
 
Monetary Policy Rule 
Following Cebi (2012), Haider and Khan (2008) and Smet and Wouters (2007), 
we define a simple Taylor type interest rate rule based on inflation and output gap (call it 
specification-I): 
    rtntnttytHrnttrt ryyrrrrr   ˆ]ˆˆˆ)[1(ˆˆˆ ,11  … …(11-A) 
Where ntrˆ represent the natural level of nominal interest rate. r is the interest rate 
smoothing coefficient and lies between zero and one. rt  is interest rate shock and which 
can be interpreted as non systematic part of the monetary policy. Parameters r  and  yr  
show the central bank preferences about inflation and output gap. Since the main aim of 
the central bank is price stability, the parameter r  should be higher than yr . This kind of 
monetary policy rule implies that Central Banks change nominal interest rates in response 
to deviation of inflation from its steady state value and deviation of output from its 
natural level. Additionally, Central Banks also take into account past value of nominal 
interest rates (when r  0) when they reset their current nominal interest rates. The high 
value for the degree of interest rate smoothing reduces the contemporary responsiveness 
of the nominal interest rates to inflation and output gap. 
Following, Choudhri and Malik (2012) and Kumhof, et al. (2008) we also 
augment Taylor Rule with a new variable, that is change in government borrowing. It is 
well defined in political macroeconomic literature, Chari, et al. (1991), Leeper (1991) 
and Sims (1994), in the presence of fiscal dominance, central bank also put some weight 
on change in government borrowing while setting policy interest rates. The modified 
version of Taylor rule (call it specification-II) is given as: 
     rtntttbnttytHrnttrt rbbryyrrrrr   ˆ)(ˆˆˆ)1(ˆˆˆ 1,11  …(11-B) 
Where, parameters r is relative weight assigned to change in government borrowing. 
This specification is also consistent with an empirical paper by Malik (2007) for Pakistan 
economy which also considers government borrowing as an important variable while 
extending simple Taylor type monetary policy rule. 
 
Fiscal Policy Rules 
Following Cebi (2012) and Muscatelli and Tirelli (2005) we consider a backward 
looking form for the fiscal policy reaction function by taking into account lagged 
responses of fiscal policy to economic activity. We also assume smoothing of fiscal 
instruments, as Favero and Monacelli (2005) and Forni, Monetforte and Sessa (2009). 
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   gttbnttygtgt bgyyggg   ˆˆˆ)1(ˆˆ 111  … … … (12) 

  ttb
n
ttyttt byy ])([1( 111  … … … (13) 
Parameters g and  denote the degree of fiscal smoothing. Parameters gy and y 
demonstrate the sensitivities of government spending and tax to past value of output gap. 
Parameters gb and b correspond to feedback coefficient on unobservable debt stock. 
g
t  
and t  are government spending and tax shocks and which represent the non-systematic 
component of discretionary fiscal policy.  
 
The Government Solvency Constraint 
Finally the model is completed by fiscal constraint. As in Cebi (2012), Kirsonva, 
et al. (2007), and Fragetta and Kirsonva (2010) a log-linearised government solvency 
constraint or fiscal constraint can be expressed as: 
   







 tttttHttt g
B
C
ybrb ˆˆˆˆ)1(ˆˆ
1
ˆˆ
,1  … … … (14) 
Where, 









1,
ln
tH
t
t
P
B
b , Bt is nominal debt stock. B  is the steady state debt to GDP 
ratio, and C  steady state consumption to GDP ratio. 
 
4.  CALIBRATION RESULTS 
In this section we estimate structural parameters values as well as shocks to 
the parameters.  We do determine some of the values of parameters described in the 
model and while few are taken from other studies in this area particularly that of 
Haider and Khan (2008), Ahmad, et al. (2012), Ahmed, et al. (2012) and Choudhri 
and Malik (2012). Parameter’s values are reported in Table A1. Based on these 
parameter values, we have calibrated model with two monetary policy rules 
specifications. The statistical result in terms of variance decompositions, cross 
correlations, and autocorrelations are reported in Table A2 to Table A4 and given in 
Appendix section. These results fairly replicate business cycle characteristics of 
Pakistan economy. Now, for policy related discussion, we would like to explain in 
the results of impulse responses to exogenous shocks and want to learn how 
monetary and fiscal policy interacts to each shock.  
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
Economic theories identified and recognised numerous shocks. These shocks have 
different implication for different macroeconomic variables. Some affect aggregate 
supply while others affect aggregate demand. Some shock affects both aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply simultaneously.  There are also some sorts of shocks that affect 
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nominal characteristics of the economy. Figure A1 to A6 summarises Calibration and the 
resulting responses of different variable of interest to shocks.   
Response of Domestic Output to Various Shocks 
In Figure A1, the first schematic presentation outlines the response of domestic 
output to technology shock. The figure reveals that output follows the usual behaviour 
and has a positive response to technological shock. Level of domestic output deviates 
from the steady state as the technology shock hits the economy. In the beginning the 
output increase abruptly and formed a hum shaped. The response of domestic output also 
shows a high degree of persistence as it does not returns back to its steady state up to 16 
quarters. We know that DSGE model is largely based on micro foundation and have the 
attributes of real business cycle. The response of domestic output to positive 
technological shocks is large and considerable. This is compatible with the existing 
literature as standard economic theory considers technological advancement as positive 
supply shock.  
Second figure shows the response of domestic output to world output shocks. It is 
a well documented fact that no single country is cut off from the outside world in the 
current globalised world.  Higher degree of financial integration and improved means of 
transportation and communication expose economies to external shocks. Mundell-
Fleming model explores the vulnerability of domestic economy to shocks, especially 
world output and world interest rate shocks. These shocks are supposed to be transmitted 
from one economy to another. Our economy is also vulnerable and exposed to external 
shock in the world economy. Keeping in view the limitation of this thesis, we just 
incorporate world output shock. We employed a small open economy DSGE model. 
Figure shows that domestic output responds positively to world output shock. In the 
beginning domestic output rises sharply and remains above its steady state level for 6 
quarters. Then it decline for a very short period and abruptly converges to its steady state.    
The third graph shows the response of domestic output to inflation shock. High 
price level damages the macroeconomic performance of the country.  When inflation hits 
the economy, output starts to decline and it remains below steady state for sufficiently 
long period of time. The decline in output is considerable up to three quarters and then it 
starts rising but never return to its steady state till 16 quarters. It implies that decline in 
output in response to inflationary shock is highly persistence in Pakistan. Our calibration 
follows the exact specification of Cebi. There are at least three major channels through 
which higher prices effect output level in the economy. First, an increase in the price 
level reduces consumer’s wealth that discourages them to spend less. A decrease in 
consumer’s purchasing power reduces demand in the economy resulting a fall in the 
output. Second, higher price in the economy induces the central bank to adopt tight 
monetary policy by increasing interest rate in the economy. Cost of doing business goes 
up as the capital gets expensive with the higher interest rate. This crowded private 
investment spending and reduces the overall level of output in the economy. There is 
another channel through which higher prices discourages domestic output. When there is 
inflationary pressure in the economy and the price level is rising, domestic currency 
appreciates which in turn discourage exports. Economic activities decrease with a fall in 
exports causes a decline in the domestic output. Furthermore, inflation causes the value 
of the currency to decrease. People start spending their savings in the presence of 
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inflationary pressure in the economy. Lower saving in the country also leads to a 
decrease in investment and discourages capital accumulation. The long term productivity 
falls that ultimately causes lower level of domestic output.  So inflation has negative 
impacts and hinders economic growth. 
In the next schematic presentation we investigate the response of domestic output 
to monetary policy. Interest rate is an important factor in the determination of output and 
economic growth. In our analysis the response of domestic output to monetary policy 
shock is negative. Domestic output falls with the tight monetary policy stance of the state 
bank of Pakistan. Output declines and remained below steady state up to 4 quarters. After 
4 quarters domestic output starts rising but it again die out very quickly. The high 
responsiveness of output to monetary policy shock implies that nominal rigidity is not 
hold too much in Pakistan. Because if prices are sticky then output is not responsive too 
much to monetary policy shock. It means that prices are highly flexible in Pakistan. One 
policy implication of the flexible prices is that policy’s role and effectiveness declines in 
a more volatile price environment. Second policy implication necessitates reforms in the 
behaviour of interest rate. Interest rate reforms are critical because the decision of the 
state bank of Pakistan regarding interest rate has critical implications for the investment 
and economic activities in the country.   Higher interest rate increases the cost of doing 
business. Investors are unable to get cheap loans from the banking system in the presence 
of higher interest rate. This harms Capital accumulation and ultimately growth in the 
country.  
Our analysis also uncovers a decline in output in response to positive fiscal shock 
in the form of higher taxes. Domestic output declines in the beginning and remain below 
its steady state for a short period. Output came back to its steady state and rises for two 
quarters and again die out very quickly. There are different transmission channels 
through which fiscal policy shocks, tax shocks, affect output. Imposition of higher tax has 
legitimate economic and business cost. Higher taxes increase price level. Higher prices 
and inflationary pressure in the economy discourage productive activities and causes 
output to fall. Higher taxes also discourage labour supply and employees have less 
incentive to work and earn more.  Furthermore, tax shocks also distort price signals and 
compel rational agent to substitute goods bearing lower taxes. Similarly higher taxes 
discourage producers to invest and accumulate capital further. This implies that tax 
shocks slow the process of economic growth and cause the domestic output to decline. 
The findings are very much consistent with the standard economic literature. 
We also investigate the response of domestic output to government spending 
shocks. Government spends money on the purchase of goods and services. Government 
also incurs expenditures on the development of infrastructures and carrying out public 
investments. Beside these expenditures, government also spends money on transfer 
payments. Transfer payments increases the availability of funds and purchasing power of 
the individuals. People spend more as they gets more money through transfer payments. 
So government spending promotes economic activity and influences growth. In the 
beginning domestic output expands in response to government spending shock. Output 
remains above its steady state level. It comes down to its steady state after 3 quarters and 
stayed there for seven quarters. Domestic output again converge to its steady state and 
remained there. We know that if the government has not enough resources, then its 
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continuous spending undermines growth.  Government extracts resources from the more 
productive sectors of the economy to finance its spending on less productive activities. So 
in the beginning government spending maximises output but then it declines because 
expenditures are misallocated.  This implies that fiscal shock, both higher spending and 
higher taxes, bring considerable volatility to domestic output.  We know that volatility in 
the country reduces the impact of nominal variables on real variables. The impact of 
financial sector of the economy, monetary policy, has lesser impact on the real sector of 
the economy, fiscal policy. The impact of policy intervention reduces considerably in the 
presence of volatility. Government must rationalise its spending and its revenue 
behaviour in order to improve the policy environment.  
If we compare the two specifications, it is visible that tax shocks and government 
spending shocks has a limited influence over output in the first specification. In Cebi’s 
specification, he does not incorporate government borrowing from the central bank. 
Output remains tied to its steady state for almost 16 quarters and fiscal shock has a 
negligible influence over domestic output. This implies that federal government 
borrowing in Pakistan is critical variable that affect macroeconomic variables and the 
overall performance.   
 
Response of Inflation to Various Shocks 
In Figure A2, we trace the responsiveness of inflation to different shock, 
particularly shock to fiscal and monetary policy. In the first schematic presentation we 
report the response of inflation to technology shock. Technology advancement has a 
considerable impact on output and ultimately on inflation in the country. With a 
technology shock, inflation reduces because less units of effective inputs are needed to 
produce the same output. Inflation reduces considerably and remains below its steady 
state for very long period. It converges to its steady state almost after 15 quarters. We 
have very interesting findings. If we compare the two specifications, it is visible that 
when technology shock hits the economy, decline in inflation in Cebi specification is not 
as much robust as in our case. This may be due to the inclusion of government borrowing 
from state bank of Pakistan that is largely ignores by Cebi. Cebi’s model does not 
consider government borrowing. This shows that technological shock has greater impact 
in the presence of government borrowing and fiscal policy is more effective. Inflation 
reduces to a greater extent in our scheme of things compare to the original model. This 
implies a greater role of fiscal policy in collecting the positive spillovers of the 
technological shocks. 
Positive world output shock causes prices in the international market to rise. The 
increased economic and productivity activities leads to the rise in price of different 
commodity and especially oil prices. Pakistan imports a major share of oil from the 
international markets. Any increase in the world oil price has a consequential impact on 
the economy of Pakistan in general and inflation in particular. The figure shows that 
domestic price level in the economy is highly responsive. Inflation remains it steady state 
for a very long period and do not converges to its steady state up to 16 quarters.  Any rise 
in the world output and commodity prices cause drive up the cost of factors of 
production. This has considerable impact on production and ultimately on inflation. 
World output shock also causes food prices to rise 
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Next we document the response of inflation to monetary policy shock. Impulse 
response function shows a significant decline in inflation in response to monetary 
policy shock. When monetary policy shock hits the economy, inflation declines and 
it remains below its steady state for sufficiently long period of time. The figure 
shows that inflation never returns to its steady state  up to 16 quarters. This implies 
that tight monetary policy stance of state bank of Pakistan is effective in controlling 
inflation in the country. This also contradicts findings of the Javid and Munir (2010).  
there are many possible explanations. First, data covering period as well as the 
frequency of the data different. Second reason is the issue of Prize puzzle in DSGE 
model discussed by Rabanal (2007). the second interesting thing between the two 
specification is that in our case government has state bank of Pakistan has assigned 
weights to federal government from the central bank as well as from the domestic 
commercial banks. Cebi model has not includes government borrowing from the 
central bank and the response of inflation to tight monetary policy shock as not 
significant as that in our case. In our case monetary policy is more effective when it 
takes into accounts the government borrowing.   
The next figure shows that a fiscal policy shocks, tax shocks, cause price level in 
the economy to rise. Inflation is highly responsive to tax shock and it remains above the 
steady state level. The response is also very persistent as remains there for sufficiently 
long time as positive government tax shock persist, and never return to its steady state up 
to 16 quarters. Tax rise increases the cost of production. Producers normally shift the 
incidents of taxation to the final consumers by including taxes in the prices thus resulting 
upward pressure in price level in the economy. When tax shocks hit the economy, price 
level rises in the economy. If we compare our findings with Cebi’s findings, it is visible 
that elasticity of inflation with respect to price level in our economy is high. This implies 
that in our country producers largely add taxes to the prices of their commodity and bear 
less or no burden themselves.  
In the next figure, we investigate response of inflation to government spending in 
the country.   Price level stays above its steady state for very low period and comes to its 
steady state after 2 and half quarters. Then the price level start declines. One of the 
possible explanation for the falling prices after 8 months is the positive impact of 
government spending on output. Our results also reveals that output rises with the rise in 
government spending. Inflation level declines in the economy with the increased 
availability of goods and services. 
From this figure we observed that contractionary or tight monetary policy reduces 
inflation while expansionary fiscal policy leads a price hike in the economy. This implies 
that fiscal and monetary policy works in the opposite direction and the situation demands 
for greater cooperation between fiscal and monetary authority in Pakistan. 
 
Response of Interest Rate to Various Shocks 
In Figure A3, we investigate monetary policy response to different shocks. In the 
first figure, we analyses the response of interest rate to technology shocks.  A positive 
technological shock increase the interest rate in the beginning and remain above its 
steady state up to two quarters. After that it immediately decline and stayed below the 
steady state for sufficiently long period of time. Interest rate not come back to the steady 
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state even up to 16 quarters.  This implies that monetary policy is expansionary in 
response to positive technology shock. 
We also investigate the response of monetary policy to inflation shock in the 
economy. State bank of Pakistan response positively by increasing the interest rate to 
contain the inflationary pressure in the economy. Interest rate response actively and 
remain above its steady state and not comes to its steady state up to 16 quarters. 
Purchasing power of money erodes with price hike in the economy. So in order to control 
the erosion of purchasing power of domestic currency and to bring price stability in the 
country, state bank increase its policy instrument in response to inflation shock.  
We further investigate the response of monetary policy to fiscal policy shock. We 
check both tax as well as government spending shock. Interest rate rises in response to 
tax shocks. Interest rate rise and it remains above its steady state for sufficiently long 
period of time. The response of monetary policy is significantly persistent. These are very 
interesting findings. If we compare the two specifications, it is clear that response of 
interest rate is not significant in Cebi’s specification. His findings are more accurate and 
validate economic theory. According his findings central bank should not increase 
interest rate if government obtains revenue from taxes. Obtaining revenues from 
increased taxes means a contractionary fiscal policy. So it suggests an expansionary 
monetary policy in order to offset the negative spillovers of the contractionary fiscal 
policy. But in our case, state bank of Pakistan increases interest rate along higher tax 
rates. This implies that both fiscal and monetary authority follow contractionary policies 
and are making their policies independently. This should not be the case. If the fiscal 
branch is following tight fiscal policy then state bank of Pakistan must adopt loose 
monetary policy. There is a room for fiscal and monetary policy coordination because 
both higher interest rate and higher taxes badly effect the macroeconomic performance of 
the country.  
Here it is also very important to compare the two specifications. In Cebi’s 
specification, he does not assigned any weight to government borrowing. In his set 
up, the response of interest rate to technology shock is not considerable and it fell 
slightly. This also supports the finding of Clarida, et al. (1999) that central bank is 
not fully accommodative to technology and the monetary policy is not highly 
responsive. The response of interest rate remains flat for sufficiently long period of 
time. In our specification, we incorporate government sector and gave weight to 
federal government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. In this case interest rate 
rises in the beginning, but it should not be the case. Because, according to Cebi’s 
specification if government increases government taxes, then the central bank is 
supposed not to increase interest rate. But in our case it is increases which is not 
good for the economy.    
 
Response of Government Borrowing to Various Shocks 
In Figure A4, we investigate the response of government borrowing to different 
shocks. The response of government borrowing to inflation in positive. When there is 
inflation shock in the economy, government borrowing increases. It increases and 
remained above its steadiest rate up to 7 quarters. After 7 quarters the government 
borrowing comes to its steady rate and stayed there afterward till 16 quarters. The main 
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reason is that government is now paying more and incurred extra expenditure for the 
same goods and services.  
Next we examine the response of government borrowing to monetary policy 
shocks. Government borrowing decreases in response of interest rate shock. Government  
borrowing lies below its steady state up to 5 quarters. Then it comes to its steady state 
and remained there up to 16 quarters. State bank of Pakistan knows that budget deficits 
and borrowing of the federal government from state bank creating many problems. In 
order to contain excessive government borrowing and the ruthless use of public 
exchequer. State bank of Pakistan keeps the discount rate high in order to avoid panic and 
stress and to force the federal government to adopt appropriate behaviour by rationalising 
its messy spending.  
We also examine the response of government debt to tax shock. Government 
borrowing increases in response to a positive tax shock and remain above its steady state 
up to 6 quarters and then it joins its steady state level. There are many reasons for the 
positive response of government borrowing to tax shock. First tax erodes production 
activities and discourage capital accumulation. Low economic activities reduces 
government revenue from taxation and borrow from the banking system in order to 
finance its expenditure. Second, tax revenue is not enough to finance excessive federal 
government spending. If government expenditures are more than its revenues, then 
government borrowing increases along with higher taxes in the country.  
We also investigate the response of government borrowing from state bank of 
Pakistan to fiscal shocks called government spending shock. Government borrowing 
decreases and stays below its steady state till 16 quarters. The response shows very 
persistent behaviour. There are many possible justifications for the negative response of 
government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan to government spending shock. For 
example, when the federal government increases its spending and the expenditure are 
greater than the revenue generated from taxes, then government resort state bank for 
providing money. State bank of Pakistan in return keeps the discount rate higher in order 
to restrict government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. In this case it seems that 
monetary policy of state bank of Pakistan is effective in controlling federal government 
borrowing from the state bank. Another justification is that government borrows from 
external sources in order to finance its spending.   
 
Response of Government Spending to Various Shocks 
In Figure A5, we trace the response of government spending to different shocks in 
the economy. A rise in total factor productivity or technology shock causes domestic 
output to increase. In the first figure, response of government spending to technology 
shock is positive. Government spending deviates and remain above its steady state for 
many periods and never returned to steady state up to 16 quarters. This implies that there 
is a positive relationship between government spending and positive technology shocks. 
This shows a pro-cyclical fiscal policy behaviour in Pakistan. In earlier figure we noticed 
that output respond significantly to technology shocks. When economic activities 
stimulates in the country, government revenue also increases, enabling the government to 
spend more and more on the welfare of its public. Government may increase new projects 
and develop new infrastructures. All this will increase government spending.   
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Government spending also increases in response to a positive world output shocks. 
Initially government spending remains above its steady state for almost 10 quarters. After 
10 quarters, the shocks causes government spending to comes to its steady state and 
remain there up to 16 quarters.   
In the next figure we investigate the response of  government spending to inflation 
is positive. It means that in the presence of inflationary pressure in the economy, the 
government expenditure increases. Just like individual consumers, higher prices also hurt 
purchasing power of the government because rising prices means paying more for the 
same amount of goods and services. In the beginning, inflation shock stimulates 
government spending and is rising up to 3 quarters. After 3 quarters it started declining 
and reached to steady state after 12 quarters and stay there.  
In the next figure we investigate the response of government spending to monetary 
policy shock.. state bank of Pakistan adopt tight monetary policy by keeping interest rate 
high in order to control the ruthless spending and government borrowing from the central 
and commercial banks. The analysis shows that state bank policy is effective to some 
extent in containing government spending. Monetary policy mainly influence aggregate 
demand and we know that government spending is an important element of aggregate 
demand equation. Government spending reduces to monetary policy shock and it declines 
up to 11 quarters and then it reaches to its steady state. 
In the next  figure we analysed the response of government spending to tax 
revenue shocks. It is visible from the figure that government increases public spending in 
response to a positive tax shock. Government spending rises till nine quarter and then it 
comes to its steady state and stayed there up to 16 quarters. When government’s revenues 
increases from taxes, additional resources are now available making it easy and possible 
for the government to fund its project and exiting programs. This implies that a rise in tax 
revenue exert extra pressure on government to carry out additional public spending.  It 
implies that government spending is elastic and respond to tax revenue shocks. 
 
Response of Government Revenue to Various Shocks 
Technology shocks play an important role and bring business fluctuation and 
economic volatility. Our analysis shows that government revenue responds to technology 
shocks (Figure A6). Total factor productivity and economic activities increase with a 
positive technology shock. Income level of the economy rises. Tax revenue also increases 
with the rise in income in the presence of any of the two tax system, constant or 
progressive tax system.  
We also trace the response of tax revenue to inflation. Cost of production increase 
with inflation and discourages output. Aggregate supply shrinking. In the presence of 
high and volatile inflation in the economy, the producer increases the wages of the 
employee as the workers often demand for increased wages. Higher price means 
reduction in the purchasing power and discourage consumer spending. Agents are now 
paying more for goods and services.  Higher prices restrict output and reduce production. 
This dampen economic growth and cause government revenue from taxes. In the start tax 
revenue increase with price shock. This validate economic theory. In the beginning, price 
shock maximises producer’s profit and they respond to it by increasing production. This 
increase tax revenue in the short run. But this rise in the revenue persist for a short period 
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of two quarters and it die out very quickly. It remains below its steady state for 
sufficiently large period of time and never returned to steady state till 16 quarters.   
The response of tax revenue to monetary policy shock is significant. Quantitative 
tightening in the form of reduced money supply or higher interest rate increase the cost of 
doing business and discourage economic activities. Higher interest rate also crowd out 
private investment. In order to control the inflationary pressure in the economy, state 
bank of Pakistan raises the interest rate and reduces the amount of lending. Business find 
it harder to get easy and  cheap credit halting economic activities to stimulate. Cost of 
doing business goes up. Production activities declines and so government revenue. 
Higher interest rate also discourage consumers spending. People now spend less and 
increases their saving. Lower economic activities reduces government revenue from 
taxes. Tax revenue decreases up to 5 quarters. Tax revenue becomes to its steady state 
and remained there till 16 quarters.  
We also investigate the response of tax revenues to government spending shock. 
Government spending increase budget deficit and interest rate. As government spending 
increases, borrowing from state bank and other commercial banks also rises. This drives 
up interest rate higher which increases the cost of capital. Investment crowded out and 
ultimately productivity activities decline with the rising interest rate. Tax revenue also 
decreases with slower economic activities. In our analysis response of tax revenue is 
considerable to government spending shocks. Tax revenues deviate from steady state and 
not return to steady state till 16 quarter. 
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we attempt to model the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in 
Pakistan in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.  In this scheme of things, we 
permit and assign a bigger role to the fiscal policy and government borrowing. Our 
findings reveal that fiscal and monetary policy interacts in Pakistan.  
The key findings of our analysis reveal that fiscal and monetary policy interacts 
with each others in response to shocks to different variables. We also include, 
government borrowing, technology as well as foreign output shock besides fiscal and 
monetary policy shocks. Briefly speaking the behaviour of domestic output follows the 
usual behaviour and has a positive response to technological shock. Level of domestic 
output deviates from the steady state as the technology shock hits the economy. Domestic 
output also shows a high degree of persistence. DSGE model is largely based on micro 
foundation and have the attributes of real business cycle. The response of domestic output 
to positive technological shocks is large and considerable and is compatible with the 
existing literature as standard economic theory considers technological advancement a 
positive supply shock. Our findings show that domestic output responds positively to 
world output shock. Our calibration goes and investigates the response of domestic 
output to inflationary shock. When inflation hits the economy, output starts to decline and 
it remains below steady state for sufficiently long period of time. The decline in output is 
considerable up to three quarters and then it starts rising but never return to its steady.  
Decline in output in response to inflationary shock is highly persistence in Pakistan. 
 Interest rate is an important factor in the determination of output and economic 
growth. In our analysis the response of domestic output to monetary policy shock is 
Muhammad Shahid, Abdul Qayyum and Waseem Shahid Malik Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions……. 
20 
negative and domestic output falls with the tight monetary policy stance of the state bank 
of Pakistan. The high responsiveness of output to monetary policy shock implies that 
nominal rigidity is not hold too much in Pakistan. This has very critical and important 
policy implications. First, role of economic policy declines in the absence of nominal 
rigidity and more volatile environment. Second policy implication necessitates reforms in 
the behaviour of interest rate. Interest rate reforms are critical because the decision of the 
state bank of Pakistan regarding interest rate has critical implications for the investment 
and economic activities in the country.   Our analysis also uncovers a decline in output in 
response to fiscal shock in the form of higher taxes. We also investigate the response of 
domestic output to government spending shocks. Domestic output expands in response to 
government spending shock as increased government spending promotes economic 
activities and influences growth.  
In Pakistan, technology advancement has a considerable impact on output and 
ultimately on inflation in the country. With a technology shock, inflation reduces because 
fewer units of effective inputs are needed to produce the same output. Inflation reduces 
considerably in response to technology shock. We also find that government spending 
responds positively and has increased with the introduction of new technology. This 
implies a greater role of fiscal policy in collecting the positive spillovers of the 
technological shocks. Inflation is also significantly responsive to monetary policy shock. 
When monetary policy shock hits the economy, inflation declines and it remains below 
its steady state for sufficiently long period of time. Tight monetary policy stance of state 
bank of Pakistan is effective in controlling inflation in the country. This contradicts 
findings of Javid and Munir (2010) where they find that phenomenon of price puzzle 
exists in Pakistan and monetary policy is not effective. Results also show that monetary 
policy is more effective when state bank gives weight to federal government borrowing. 
This means that state bank of Pakistan must give weight to fiscal policy in designing its 
objective function while formulating monetary policy. Inflation is also highly responsive 
to both the instruments of fiscal policy shocks. Price level in the economy rises with a 
surge in taxes. Elasticity of inflation with respect to taxes in Pakistan’s economy is high. 
This implies that producers largely add taxes to the prices of their commodity and bear 
less or no burden themselves. Inflation is also responsive and deviates from its 
equilibrium state with increased government spending. Contractionary or tight monetary 
policy reduces inflation while expansionary fiscal policy leads a price hike in the 
economy indicating that both fiscal and monetary policy works in the opposite direction 
and the situation demands for greater cooperation between fiscal and monetary authority 
in Pakistan. 
Inspecting the response of monetary policy to inflation shock in the economy 
unveil that state bank of Pakistan response positively by increasing the interest rate to 
contain the inflationary pressure in the economy. Examining monetary policy response to 
different shocks disclose that a positive technology shock increase the policy rate. 
Monetary policy also respond to fiscal policy shocks as state bank increases its policy 
rate to counter the negatives associated with excessive federal government spending. 
Fiscal policy also responds to monetary policy instruments. Government borrowing from 
state bank reduces with high policy rate. It means that monetary policy is effective in 
controlling fiscal profligacy. On the other hand federal government borrowing rises with 
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inflation. Government borrowing also increases in response to a positive tax shock. A rise 
in total factor productivity or technology shock causes government spending to deviates 
and remains above its steady state indicating the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in 
Pakistan. Government revenue rises with stimulating economic activities that enables the 
government to spend more and more on the welfare of its public.  Government spending 
to inflation is highly elastic and increases in the presence of inflationary pressure in the 
economy. Preserving price stability is critical in order to reduce the burden on already 
squeesed treasury. Government expenditures are also elastic and public spending surge in 
response to a positive tax shock. Tax revenue also responds negatively to inflation. Tax is 
very important instrument of the fiscal policy and we report a significant response of tax 
to monetary policy shock. Quantitative tightening in the form of reduced money supply 
or higher interest rate increase the cost of doing business and discourage economic 
activities. Lower economic activities reduce government revenue from taxes. The 
response of tax revenues to government spending shock is negative.  
Keeping the above discussion in perspective, we come to the conclusion that fiscal 
and monetary policy interacts with each other in Pakistan. So greater coordination 
between treasury benches and state bank of Pakistan is needed in order to increase the 
effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in the country.   
 
RESULTS APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
Selection of Parameter Values 
Parameter Description Value Reference 
 Degree of Openness 0.23 Haider and Khan (2008) 
 Subjective Discount Factor 0.99 Ahmed, et al. (2012) 
 Degree of Price Stickiness 0.24 Haider and Khan (2008) 
 Inverse Elasticity of Labour Supply 1.00 Haider and Khan (2008) 
 Inverse Elasticity of Substitution in Consumption Supply 0.59 Ahmed, et al. (2012) 
r Degree of Interest Rate Smoothing 0.28 Ahmed, et al. (2012) 
Y Taylor Rule Coefficient on Inflation 1.48 Ahmed, et al. (2012) 
y Taylor Rule Coefficient on Output Gap 0.52 Ahmed, et al. (2012) 
g Degree of Govt. Spending Smoothing 0.78 Ahmed, et al. (2012) 
gy Spending Coefficient on Past Output Gap 0.01 Author’s Calculations 
 Degree of Tax Smoothing 0.22 Author’s Calculations 
y Tax Coefficient on Past Output Gap 0.01 Author’s Calculations 
gb Spending Coefficient on Debt 0.03 Author’s Calculations 
b Tax Coefficient on Debt 0.01 Author’s Calculations 
 Degree of Backwardness 0.76 Haider and Khan (2008) 
a AR Coefficient of Technology 0.91 Ahmad, et al. (2012) 
y
* AR Coefficient of World Output 0.36 Ahmad, et al. (2012) 
a SD of Technology Innovation  0.02 Ahmad, et al. (2012) 
 SD of Inflation Innovation 0.05 Author’s Calculations 
y
* SD of World Consumption Innovation 0.02 Author’s Calculations 
r SD of Interest Rate Innovation 0.02 Ahmad, et al. (2012) 
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g SD of Govt. Spending Innovation 0.14 Ahmad, et al. (2012) 
 SD of Tax Innovation 0.06 Author’s Calculations 
Table A2 
Variance Decomposition 
 
Specification 1: Without Government Borrowing 
 
                   
     99.21 0.23 0.50 0.05 0.00 0.00 
   99.02 0.65 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.03 
   31.43 1.36 0.49 0.01 66.70 0.00 
   0.01 0.01 99.83 0.08 0.08 0.00 
   0.46 0.03 3.01 96.50 0.01 0.00 
   0.08 0.10 98.42 1.01 0.38 0.00 
 
Specification 2: With Government Borrowing 
 
                   
    81.43 0.29 17.98 0.31 0.00 0.00 
   64.91 0.14 33.37 1.56 0.01 0.01 
   25.14 0.93 19.03 0.50 54.41 0.00 
   0.01 0.01 99.82 0.09 0.08 0.00 
   0.44 0.02 2.92 96.60 0.01 0.00 
   0.08 0.09 98.52 0.92 0.38 0.00 
 
Table A3 
Matrix of Correlation 
 
Specification 1: Without Government Borrowing 
 
                   
     1.00 0.99 -0.55 -0.06 -0.03 0.08 
   0.99 1.00 -0.57 -0.03 -0.34 0.06 
   -0.55 -0.57 1.00 0.08 0.03 0.00 
   -0.06 -0.03 0.08 1.00 -0.15 -0.96 
   -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.15 1.00 0.27 
   0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.96 0.27 1.00 
 
Specification 2: With Government Borrowing 
 
                   
    1.00 0.86 -0.41 -0.24 0.02 0.27 
   0.86 1.00 -0.58 -0.46 0.15 0.51 
   -0.41 -0.58 1.00 0.08 0.01 -0.05 
   -0.24 -0.46 0.08 1.00 -0.14 -0.99 
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   0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.14 1.00 0.25 
   0.27 0.51 -0.05 -0.99 0.25 1.00 
Table A4 
Autocorrelations 
 
Specification 1: Without Government Borrowing 
Order 1 2 3 4 5 
     0.922 0.792 0.655 0.530 0.424 
   0.925 0.796 0.660 0.535 0.429 
   0.967 0.919 0.868 0.822 0.780 
   0.931 0.810 0.678 0.554 0.446 
   0.438 0.158 0.058 0.026 0.015 
   0.844 0.694 0.562 0.451 0.358 
 
Specification 2: With Government Borrowing 
Order 1 2 3 4 5 
     0.933 0.816 0.690 0.572 0.468 
   0.814 0.688 0.589 0.504 0.430 
   0.824 0.730 0.676 0.640 0.614 
   0.923 0.793 0.655 0.530 0.422 
   0.438 0.168 0.068 0.032 0.018 
   0.904 0.771 0.636 0.515 0.412 
 
Fig. A1. Response of Domestic Output 
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Fig. A2.  Response of Domestic Inflation 
0.0480
0.0500
0.0520
0.0540
0.0560
0.0580
0.0600
0.0620
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
D
ev
iat
io
n 
fro
m
 S
tea
dy
 S
tat
e
Technology Shock (Specification 1)
Technology Shock (Specification 2)
Quarters
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
D
ev
iat
io
n 
fro
m
 S
tea
dy
 S
tat
e
Foreign Output Shock (Specification 1)
Foreign Output Shock (Specification 2)
Quarters
-0.1000
-0.0500
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0.1500
0.2000
0.2500
0.3000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
D
ev
iat
io
n 
fro
m
 S
tea
dy
 S
tat
e
Government Spending Shock (Specification 1)
Government Spending Shock (Specification 2)
Quarters
-0.1600
-0.1400
-0.1200
-0.1000
-0.0800
-0.0600
-0.0400
-0.0200
0.0000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
D
ev
iat
io
n 
fro
m
 S
tea
dy
 S
tat
e
Inflation Shock (Specification 1)
Inflation Shock (Specification 2)
Quarters
-0.0700
-0.0600
-0.0500
-0.0400
-0.0300
-0.0200
-0.0100
0.0000
0.0100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
D
ev
iat
io
n 
fro
m
 S
tea
dy
 S
tat
e
Monetary Policy Shock (Specification 1)
Monetary Policy Shock (Specification 2)
Quarters
-0.0400
-0.0300
-0.0200
-0.0100
0.0000
0.0100
0.0200
0.0300
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
D
ev
iat
io
n 
fro
m
 S
tea
dy
 S
tat
e
Tax Revenue Shock (Specification 1)
Tax Revenue Shock (Specification 2)
Quarters
Research Journal Social Sciences Volume 6, No. 1 
25 
 
 
Fig. A3.  Response of Interest Rate 
 
Fig. A4.  Response of Government Borrowing 
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Fig. A5.  Response of Government Spending 
 
Fig. A6.  Response of Tax Revenue 
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